Does powerful executive holding a dual post as the board secretary reduce nonpunitive regulation?

Department of Finance, Accounting and Economics

Research output: Journal Publication › Article

Original language	English
Journal	International Review of Financial Analysis
Volume	89
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102797
Publication status	Published - Oct 2023

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Access to Document

10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102797

Cite this

@article{d93930c1a84a4ababa990653ed6380af,

title = "Does powerful executive holding a dual post as the board secretary reduce nonpunitive regulation?",

author = "Keying Zhu",

year = "2023",

month = oct,

doi = "10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102797",

language = "English",

volume = "89",

journal = "International Review of Financial Analysis",

issn = "1057-5219",

publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",

}