TY - JOUR
T1 - Join logistics sharing alliance or not? Incentive analysis of competing E-commerce firms with promised-delivery-time
AU - Niu, Baozhuang
AU - Xie, Fengfeng
AU - Chen, Lei
AU - Xu, Xin
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors are grateful to the managing editor and three reviewers for their helpful comments. The first author's work was supported by NSFC Excellent Young Scientists Fund (No. 71822202 ), NSFC (No. 71571194 ), Chang Jiang Scholars Program (Niu Baozhuang 2017), GDUPS (Niu Baozhuang 2017). Fengfeng Xie is the co-first author. The corresponding author is Lei Chen. Appendix
Funding Information:
The authors are grateful to the managing editor and three reviewers for their helpful comments. The first author's work was supported by NSFC Excellent Young Scientists Fund (No. 71822202), NSFC (No. 71571194), Chang Jiang Scholars Program (Niu Baozhuang 2017), GDUPS (Niu Baozhuang 2017). Fengfeng Xie is the co-first author. The corresponding author is Lei Chen.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019
PY - 2020/6
Y1 - 2020/6
N2 - E-commerce firms such as JD.com have launched logistics sharing alliance (LSA) by providing logistics services to the society. However, should their rivals having logistics service disadvantages join the LSA? In this paper, we formulate competing e-commerce firms' incentives regarding logistics cooperation via LSA. Firm A (she) offers LSA. Firm B (he) may guarantee customers a promised delivery time (PDT), although he has logistics services disadvantages. Without PDT, we find that firm B's profit performance joining LSA will be hurt when the market competition intensity degree is either high or low. We characterize firm B's total sales and the allocation ratio because of firm A's logistics sharing to explain this interesting finding. In contrast, when firm B has PDT guarantee, we find that he will join LSA when the PDT cost is high and the competition intensity degree is low. That is, PDT increases firm B's incentives to join LSA when he faces mild competition from firm A.
AB - E-commerce firms such as JD.com have launched logistics sharing alliance (LSA) by providing logistics services to the society. However, should their rivals having logistics service disadvantages join the LSA? In this paper, we formulate competing e-commerce firms' incentives regarding logistics cooperation via LSA. Firm A (she) offers LSA. Firm B (he) may guarantee customers a promised delivery time (PDT), although he has logistics services disadvantages. Without PDT, we find that firm B's profit performance joining LSA will be hurt when the market competition intensity degree is either high or low. We characterize firm B's total sales and the allocation ratio because of firm A's logistics sharing to explain this interesting finding. In contrast, when firm B has PDT guarantee, we find that he will join LSA when the PDT cost is high and the competition intensity degree is low. That is, PDT increases firm B's incentives to join LSA when he faces mild competition from firm A.
KW - Co-opetition
KW - E-commerce
KW - Logistics sharing
KW - Promised delivery time
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85076221475&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.107553
DO - 10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.107553
M3 - Article
SN - 0925-5273
VL - 224
JO - International Journal of Production Economics
JF - International Journal of Production Economics
M1 - 107553
ER -