Perk consumption and CEO turnover

Yifan Zhan; Hung Gay Fung; Wai Kin Leung

doi:10.1007/s11156-023-01241-5

Perk consumption and CEO turnover

Yifan Zhan, Hung Gay Fung, Wai Kin Leung

Department of Finance, Accounting and Economics

Research output: Journal Publication › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between perk consumption and forced CEO turnover. The results based on Chinese firms indicate that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover increases with excess perk consumption by executives. The positive effect of excess perk consumption on CEO dismissal declines when the firms are momentum winners in market returns and profitability while it rises when firms are momentum losers. Non-co-opted independent directors amplify the positive effect of excess perks on forced CEO turnover whereas board gender diversity reduces such likelihood. Better educated CEOs appear to consume fewer excess perks, reducing the likelihood of forced turnover.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1525-1568
Number of pages	44
Journal	Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
Volume	62
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-023-01241-5
Publication status	Published - May 2024

Keywords

Board characteristics
CEO self-discipline
Excess perks
Forced CEO turnover
G34
J63
Momentum losers and momentum winners

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Accounting
General Business,Management and Accounting
Finance

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10.1007/s11156-023-01241-5

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Perk consumption and CEO turnover

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Keywords

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