Process Spillovers and Growth: A Comment on the Existence of a Stable Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium

Shravan Luckraz

doi:10.1007/s10957-010-9781-3

Process Spillovers and Growth: A Comment on the Existence of a Stable Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium

Shravan Luckraz

Research output: Journal Publication › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In a recent paper Luckraz (J. Optim. Theory Appl. 139:315-335, 2008) develops a differential game model to show that a lack of intellectual property protection can improve economic growth in economies, where large technology gaps prevail. However, this conclusion depends crucially on the fact that the closed-loop equilibrium of the model degenerates to the open-loop equilibrium. This note generalizes the results of Luckraz by formulating a setup in which the closed-loop equilibrium does not degenerate to the open-loop equilibrium of the differential game.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	229-237
Number of pages	9
Journal	Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Volume	149
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-010-9781-3
Publication status	Published - Feb 2011
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Applied differential games
Closed-loop equilibrium
Cournot competition
Research and development (R&D) games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Management Science and Operations Research
Control and Optimization
Applied Mathematics

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Access to Document

10.1007/s10957-010-9781-3

Cite this

@article{f2beac1462024305b2789df9e8401752,

title = "Process Spillovers and Growth: A Comment on the Existence of a Stable Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium",

abstract = "In a recent paper Luckraz (J. Optim. Theory Appl. 139:315-335, 2008) develops a differential game model to show that a lack of intellectual property protection can improve economic growth in economies, where large technology gaps prevail. However, this conclusion depends crucially on the fact that the closed-loop equilibrium of the model degenerates to the open-loop equilibrium. This note generalizes the results of Luckraz by formulating a setup in which the closed-loop equilibrium does not degenerate to the open-loop equilibrium of the differential game.",

keywords = "Applied differential games, Closed-loop equilibrium, Cournot competition, Research and development (R&D) games",

author = "Shravan Luckraz",

year = "2011",

month = feb,

doi = "10.1007/s10957-010-9781-3",

language = "English",

volume = "149",

pages = "229--237",

journal = "Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications",

issn = "0022-3239",

publisher = "Springer New York",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Process Spillovers and Growth

T2 - A Comment on the Existence of a Stable Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium

AU - Luckraz, Shravan

PY - 2011/2

Y1 - 2011/2

N2 - In a recent paper Luckraz (J. Optim. Theory Appl. 139:315-335, 2008) develops a differential game model to show that a lack of intellectual property protection can improve economic growth in economies, where large technology gaps prevail. However, this conclusion depends crucially on the fact that the closed-loop equilibrium of the model degenerates to the open-loop equilibrium. This note generalizes the results of Luckraz by formulating a setup in which the closed-loop equilibrium does not degenerate to the open-loop equilibrium of the differential game.

AB - In a recent paper Luckraz (J. Optim. Theory Appl. 139:315-335, 2008) develops a differential game model to show that a lack of intellectual property protection can improve economic growth in economies, where large technology gaps prevail. However, this conclusion depends crucially on the fact that the closed-loop equilibrium of the model degenerates to the open-loop equilibrium. This note generalizes the results of Luckraz by formulating a setup in which the closed-loop equilibrium does not degenerate to the open-loop equilibrium of the differential game.

KW - Applied differential games

KW - Closed-loop equilibrium

KW - Cournot competition

KW - Research and development (R&D) games

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79952104293&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10957-010-9781-3

DO - 10.1007/s10957-010-9781-3

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:79952104293

SN - 0022-3239

VL - 149

SP - 229

EP - 237

JO - Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

JF - Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

IS - 1

ER -

Process Spillovers and Growth: A Comment on the Existence of a Stable Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

UN SDGs

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this